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Global Value Chains and the Governance
of ‘Embedded’ Food Commodities:
The Case of Soy
Tony Heron, Patricia Prado and Chris West
University of York
Abstract
In recent decades, soy has emerged as one of the world’s most signiﬁcant food-related commodities and is strongly linked to
deforestation and habitat loss, especially in Latin America. However, only a very small proportion of soy is consumed directly
as food by humans with the rest crushed to produce animal feed, oils, biofuel and other industrial products. We argue that
the peculiar (but not necessarily unique) structural and institutional characteristics of the soy supply chain raises crucial ques-
tions about the promotion of sustainability in complex, non-consumer facing global value chains (GVCs). The particular way
that soy is ‘embedded’ in the food system has meant that consumer-facing ﬁrms have been shielded from the externalities of
its production and trade to a much larger degree than is the case for comparable food commodities. This, in turn, helps to
explain the widely perceived inadequacies of the private certiﬁcation of ‘sustainable soy’ – and ongoing and wider political
struggles around land, labour and the environment – for more comprehensive and inclusive forms of governance.
This Special Issue deals with the most widely debated aspect
of the global value chain (GVC) framework: that is, the
appropriation of the term ‘governance’ and the various ways
that this is conceptualised and applied to different cases
(Eckhardt and Poletti, 2018). In this article, we contribute to
this debate through a speciﬁc focus on agrifood GVCs.
Although agrifood has ﬁgured prominently in the GVC litera-
ture, the dominant tendency has been to focus on the
power of major retailers to control supply chains through
the use of private standards, thus determining the condi-
tions in which upstream suppliers participate in these chains
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Fold, 2002; Henson and Hum-
phrey, 2010; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Ponte, 2009; Tallon-
tire, 2007). We aim to contribute to a growing literature that
looks beyond these questions to consider the broader struc-
tural and institutional context in which agrifood GVCs are sit-
uated. We examine how this context shapes, not just the
creation and distribution of economic value, but wider issues
of social and environmental sustainability, transparency and
democratic control (Fold, 2002; Lee et al., 2012; Ponte, 2009).
To analyse the governance of agrifood GVCs, we focus on
the speciﬁc case of soy. In recent decades, soy has emerged
as one of the world’s most signiﬁcant agro-commodities
and is strongly linked to deforestation and habitat loss,
especially in Latin America, which is now responsible for
close to 60 per cent of global production (USDA, 2015). Cru-
cially, only 6 per cent of soy is consumed directly as food
by humans (mainly in Asia) with the rest crushed to produce
animal feed, oils, biofuel and other industrial products
(WWF, 2014). This ‘embedded’ character means that the
intensity and extensity of soy production and trade is often
understated in ofﬁcial statistics, and lacks visibility from a
consumer perspective. Soy also belies the linearity implicit
in standard GVC models, where in this case powerful agro-
chemical companies (e.g. Monsanto, Syngenta and Dupont)
and trading houses (e.g. ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis
Dreyfus) are located upstream of the major retailers, with
whom ultimate power is often thought to lie. Finally, the
role of soy in changing land use in Latin America has meant
that the sector has proven to be a lightning rod for social
and political struggles over land use, labour and community
rights, and environmental justice (Gibbs et al., 2015; Lima
et al., 2011; Oliveira and Hecht, 2016).
In the article, we map and analyse the governance of the
GVC for soy and the role of different structures, institutions
and actors therein. We begin with a critical engagement
with the relevant GVC literature and the key concept of gov-
ernance. We then turn to our case study and ask what are
the main characteristics of the soy GVC and how do these
correspond to established models of GVC governance. We
argue that the peculiar (but not necessarily unique) struc-
tural and institutional characteristics of the soy supply chain
raise crucial questions about the promotion of sustainability
in complex, non-consumer facing GVCs. The particular way
that soy is embedded in the food system has meant that
consumer-facing ﬁrms have been shielded from the exter-
nalities of its production and trade to a much larger degree
than is the case even for analogous commodities like palm
oil. Although palm oil has a similarly complex life cycle to
soy, a key difference is that the former is normally listed on
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food labels as a product ingredient and hence is more visi-
ble to consumers. Thus, even more than palm oil, the
embedded character of soy is a key to understanding the
widely perceived inadequacies of the private certiﬁcation of
‘sustainable soy’ in the search for more comprehensive and
inclusive forms of governance (Gibbs et al., 2015; Lima et al.,
2011; Oliveira and Hecht, 2016).
The governance of GVCs
Gerefﬁ (1994) was the ﬁrst to use the term governance (at
least in the sense it is now deployed by the majority of GVC
researchers) in his inﬂuential contribution to Commodity
chains and global capitalism (Gerefﬁ and Korzeniewicz,
1994). Here, Gerefﬁ (1994, p. 97) deﬁned governance as the
‘authority and power relationships that determine how
ﬁnancial, material and human resources are allocated and
ﬂow within a chain’. On this basis, Gerefﬁ distinguished
between ‘producer-driven’ and ‘buyer-driven’ chains and
argued that barriers to entry constitute the key determinant
of the ‘governance structure’ of these chains. In a subse-
quent article (Gerefﬁ et al., 2005), the buyer/producer-driven
dichotomy was supplemented with a ﬁve-fold typology,
ranging from market-based to modular, relational, captive to
hierarchical GVCs. Gerefﬁ et al. (2005) argued that the gov-
ernance structures prevailing in different GVCs is a function
of: (1) the complexity of information and knowledge trans-
ferred between lead and subordinate ﬁrms in the chain; (2)
the extent to which this information and knowledge can be
codiﬁed; and (3) the capabilities of these subordinate ﬁrms in
relation to the requirements of lead ﬁrms. As Ponte and
Sturgeon (2014) describe it, the key distinction between
Gerefﬁ’s original buyer and producer-driven GVCs model
and the subsequent ﬁve-fold typology lies in the different
way in which governance is conceptualised: whereas the
former conceptualises governance as ‘driving’ the latter sees
it in terms of ‘linking’. Ponte and Sturgeon (2014) also refer
to a third conceptualization: governance as ‘normalising’,
which refers to the application of ‘convention theory’ to
GVC analysis (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Gibbon et al., 2008;
Ponte, 2009) to capture the ways in which lead ﬁrms are
able to realign ‘a given practice to be compatible with a
standard or norm’.
Private standards and the governance of agrifood GVCs
In the same way that GVCs have emerged as the key analyt-
ical framework for understanding contemporary forms of
global trade and production, private standards have
emerged as the key analytical framework for understanding
the governance and regulation of these GVCs. In the speciﬁc
case of agrifood, standards in general are said to perform
three different functions: (1) as a mechanism by which pub-
lic or private authorities regulate the food system; (2) as a
mechanism for satisfying consumer demand for high quality
food that is safe to eat and/or meets certain ethical or envi-
ronmental standards; and (3) a mechanism for differentiat-
ing food products in contemporary food markets (Henson,
2008; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Humphrey, 2008). For GVC
governance theory, standards allow for the codiﬁcation of
commodity, resource and information ﬂows between ﬁrms
in complex supply chains, specifying the nature of different
food products, how they are produced, processed and trans-
ported, and by whom (Henson, 2008; Henson and Reardon,
2005; Humphrey, 2008). In Henson and Humphrey’s (2010)
schema, agrifood standards can be distinguished, not just
according to whether they are overseen by public or private
authorities, but also according to whether they are manda-
tory or voluntary. Hence, food standards can be based on
one of four different combinations: (1) mandatory public
standards or regulations; (2) voluntary public standards, that
is, standards created by public bodies but adopted voluntar-
ily by private actors; (3) legally mandated private standards,
that is, standards created by private actors but later made
mandatory by public bodies; and (4) voluntary private stan-
dards, that is, standards created, adopted and overseen by
private actors.
For GVC governance theory, then, the critical question is
why do these standards emerge and what explains the form
they take and the effectiveness or otherwise of these stan-
dards once implemented? Mayer and Gerefﬁ (2010) hypoth-
esise that private governance is most likely to be
forthcoming and effective in the presence of buyer-driven
GVCs in which lead ﬁrms enjoy considerable leverage over
upstream suppliers but whose brand reputation is poten-
tially vulnerable to social activism, media exposes and con-
sumer boycotts. Lee et al. (2012), similarly, point to the type
of lead ﬁrm and the degree of market concentration in a
given GVC as the key determinants of the adoption and
implementation of enhanced standards. They note, however,
that buyer-driven chains are not necessarily the norm in
agrifood GVCs. Sectors like bananas, coffee and pineapples,
for example, are classiﬁed as ‘bilateral oligopolies’ because
of the ways in which economic power is concentrated at
both the production and retail stages of the chain. Rueda
et al. (2017) reach a similar conclusion but on the basis of a
more systematic typology. They argue that the type of
instruments chosen by companies (measured according to
both stringency and scope) is determined by three condi-
tions: (1) the environmental pressures and opportunities in
respect of the sourcing of raw materials; (2) the ﬁrm’s over-
all position and therefore potential leverage in the value
chain; and (3) the marketing opportunities available to
downstream ﬁrms for certiﬁcation or other forms of product
differentiation. In the case of soy, Rueda et al. focus on Car-
gill’s decision to sign the Soy Moratorium, prohibiting the
use of soy grown on lands deforested after July 2006. The
moratorium, they suggest, was signed because it satisﬁed
conditions (1) and (2) but not (3). That is to say, Cargill’s
large market share and high level of control over its suppli-
ers (due to its dominant position in processing, distribution
and logistics) enabled it to respond to NGO pressure by
making a credible commitment in signing the soy morato-
rium. By the same token, the homogeneous nature of soy as
a commodity meant that the potential for product differenti-
ation on the basis of quality was negligible (Mayer and
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Gerefﬁ, 2010; Rueda et al., 2017). This, coupled with the low
level of consumer recognition of the Cargill brand, explains
why the ﬁrm did not necessarily feel the need to communi-
cate its decision to sign the soy moratorium to downstream
consumers. What these conclusions do not necessarily
explain, however, is why Cargill, alongside other large agro-
processing ﬁrms, also opted to participate in the Roundtable
on Responsible Soy (RTRS) certiﬁcation scheme, which in
many ways can been seen as a consumer-facing initiative
that, at least to a degree, has sought to differentiate soy on
the basis of quality attributes. These aspects of the gover-
nance of soy are part of our case study analysis, to which
we now turn.
The case of soy
Soybean has become one of the world’s rapidly expanding
soft commodities, with global production increasing from
27 m tonnes in 1961 to 335 m tonnes in 2016. This growth
has been especially dramatic in the last decade, in which
time production more than doubled (FAO, 2018). While used
in oils, biofuel and other industrial products, global demand
for soy has been driven primarily by its use as animal feed
(WWF, 2014). Soy production is heavily concentrated in a
handful of countries, with the US (117 m tonnes in 2016 –
35 per cent of global production – up from 75 m tonnes in
2000), Brazil (96 m tonnes in 2016 – 28.8 per cent of global
production – up from 33 m tonnes in 2000) and Argentina
(59 m tonnes in 2016 – 17.6 per cent of global production –
up from 20 m tonnes in 2000) being the largest producers
(FAO, 2018). The rapid expansion of soy production in Latin
America, in particular, has been associated with extensive
land use change and soy is now marked as a major driver
of deforestation in the region (WWF, 2014). Deforestation
concerns are particularly high for soy from Brazil – the lar-
gest producer in the region – in biodiversity-sensitive
regions like the Amazon rainforest and Cerrado grasslands.
Along with other soft commodities like palm oil, paper and
beef, soy is increasingly subject to attention as a ‘deforesta-
tion-risk commodity’, with agreements such as the New York
Declaration on Forests and the Amsterdam Declarations tar-
geting the reduction (and ultimate elimination) of the use of
environmentally destructive products in supply chains (Ams-
terdam Declaration 2015a, 2015b, Climate Summit, 2014).
The governance of soy
There is an ongoing debate in GVC circles as to where par-
ticular agrifood chains ‘sit’ according to dominant typolo-
gies, such as buyer-versus producer-driven and market
versus hierarchical chains. Broadly speaking, we can observe
that many agrifood chains are ‘buyer-driven’ because of the
presence of dominant retailers like Tesco, Walmart and Car-
refour, which are able to use their oligopsonic position as
‘gatekeepers’ to consumer markets in high-income (and
increasingly lower-income countries) to control and coordi-
nate global supply chains. This oligopsonic position is
derived partly from high barriers to entry in the form of
scale economies; but it also stems from the intangible assets
of these ﬁrms linked to brand reputation. According to
Ponte and Gibbon (2005), corporate power in the form of
brand reputation stems from the ability of these ﬁrms to
convey complex information to consumers regarding the
‘quality’ attributes of their products in the form of widely
accepted social standards and established codiﬁcation and
certiﬁcations processes. From this perspective, the promi-
nence of private standards in the form of codes of conduct,
alongside second or third-party certiﬁcation schemes for
speciﬁc commodities, is a function of whether or not these
GVCs are buyer-driven and consumer facing.
In what follows, we draw mainly (though not exclusively)
on data from Brazil and its links to European and UK con-
sumer markets to examine the extent to which the case of
soy conforms to these GVC assumptions. Attention within
Europe on deforestation activity linked to soy production
in regions such as Brazil is high. This can be seen, for
example, in the large number of EU-based ﬁrms that have
signed up to the 2018 ‘Cerrado Manifesto Statement of
Support’ (FAIRR, 2018). As indicated, the case of soy chal-
lenges the stark dichotomy between buyer- versus pro-
ducer-driven GVCs due to the fact that powerful players
are located at both ends of the chain. At the same time,
the ‘embedded’ character of soy in the food system has
meant that consumer-facing ﬁrms have been shielded from
the externalities of its production and trade to a much lar-
ger degree than is the case for comparable commodities
like palm oil. Thus, the ambiguities surrounding the distri-
bution of economic power in the soy value chain, coupled
with the embedded character of soy in production pro-
cesses, helps to explain the widely perceived inadequacies
of the private certiﬁcation of ‘sustainable soy’ – and ongo-
ing and wider political struggles around land, labour and
the environment – for more comprehensive and inclusive
forms of governance.
Figure 1 provides a stylised representation of the GVC for
soy typical of the EU-Latin American connection. Applying
Gerefﬁ et al.’s (2005) GVC governance framework, we can
describe some soy producers as ‘captive’ in that they have a
limited client base in areas monopolised by single traders
(Garrett et al., 2013), while we can describe other producers
as ‘market-based’ because they have greater access to multi-
ple buyers. Amaggi’s business model, though, can be seen
as an alternative, which comes close to Gerefﬁ et al.’s notion
of ‘hierarchical’ GVCs due to its direct ownership of
upstream farms (Amaggi, 2018). Soy GVCs in Latin America
show similar levels of diversity when it comes to activities
further downstream. Here, producers use a variety of busi-
ness models and perform different functions in speciﬁc seg-
ments of the chain, such as the production of animal feed
versus sourcing this from independent feed manufacturers,
through to supplying meat products direct to overseas
retailers. In Brazil, the ‘big ﬁve’ traders (ADM, Amaggi,
Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus), alongside emergent play-
ers such as Cofco, dominate the soy landscape (Trase, 2018).
Yet, many hundreds of smaller trading ﬁrms supply both
domestic and international markets in complex trading
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networks. Retailers typically source meat products from a
handful of meat manufacturers, which are linked back to
the lead ﬁrm. These ﬁrms, which often have multinational
operations and represent powerful nodes in the chain, may
also source, or supply, to actors (grey boxes, dashed arrows
in Figure 1) that sit outside the value chain of the lead trad-
ing ﬁrm. At each stage of the value chain, there is typically
a handful of actors that dominate the processing stage, but
the essence of the GVC for soy is the spatially complex dis-
tribution of the global supply chain and the complex inter-
dependencies therein.
This complexity means that, whilst the lead trading ﬁrm
has a large inﬂuence in the value chain, a number of other
important ﬁrms also inﬂuence signiﬁcantly the sourcing and
distribution of soy-linked material to the point of consump-
tion. The implications of this complexity are twofold. First,
the presence of powerful ﬁrms both ‘upstream’ and ‘down-
stream’ complicates the idea of ‘drivenness’, to the point
where the linearity implicit in the buyer-driven model loses
much of its relevance for soy. Second, the complex distribu-
tion of economic power in the soy value chain draws atten-
tion to the constrained position of the retailer compared to
the situation within other agricultural or manufacturing
GVCs. In common with the value chains for these commodi-
ties, retailers are several steps removed and geographically
isolated from the production process and therefore from the
social or environmental consequences this may have. But
the added complication with soy is that the retailer may not
possess the power to control or mitigate these effects, if it
was inclined to do so. Further, these ﬁrms cannot easily
access the data on the roles and relationships of different
actors, on environmental impacts, or on the effectiveness of
policies and actions designed to address those impacts that
would be necessary to inform their own private labelling or
certiﬁcation by a third party (Climate Focus, 2016; Gardner
et al. 2018).
Brazil-EU linkages
As the world’s leading exporter, Brazil shipped some 70 m
tonnes of soy in 2015, including 41 m tonnes of direct
exports to China and 12 m tonnes of direct exports to the
EU (Trase, 2018). From a GVC perspective, this trade is domi-
nated by the ‘big ﬁve’ soy traders that collectively exported
37 m tonnes in 2015, namely, Bunge (11.5 m tonnes), Cargill
(8.8 m tonnes), ADM (6.8 m tonnes), Louis Dreyfus (5.1 m
tonnes) and Amaggi (4.6 m tonnes). These ﬁrms are also
commonly involved in the initial processing stages for soy.
For example, Cargill, the largest single exporting trader to
the UK, operates processing facilities, animal feed manufac-
turing (also the second largest global animal feed manufac-
turer, responsible for 17.9 m tonnes of feed in 2016), and
animal production activities (Cargill Meats Europe was
responsible for 140 m slaughtered heads of chicken and tur-
key in 2016).
Further along the supply chain for soy, 31 of the world’s
leading feed manufacturers are based in the EU-28
(Wattagnet, 2018). Within this region (and across the sample
of businesses from this source), the top four by production
volume (across all feeds, irrespective of soy content) are
based in the Netherlands, with the top ten (see Table 1)
accounting for 63 per cent of total EU production. The lar-
gest UK feed producer in 2016, AB Agri, had a 2.8 per cent
market share in Europe (2.2 million tonnes), but is one of
only two listed major UK feed producers (2Agriculture Ltd is
the second, producing 924,000 tonnes).
Downstream, soy-linked animal feed is predominantly uti-
lised in the pork and poultry industries. Approximately 88 of
the world’s leading poultry (chicken and turkey) producers
are based in the EU28 (Wattagnet, 2018). Within this region,
the top ten producers have a market share of 47.1 per cent
(see Table 2). In the UK, four companies dominate produc-
tion, accounting for 86.5 per cent of market share: 2 Sisters
Food Group (317 m heads), Moy Park Ltd (260 m heads),
Cargill Meats Europe (140 m heads) and Faccenda Group
(100 m heads).
Finally, retail markets across Europe are also typically
dominated by a handful of actors. In the UK, four supermar-
kets account for over 70 per cent of market share (Tesco,
27.9 per cent; Sainsbury’s, 16.2 per cent; Asda, 15.6 per cent;
Morrisons, 10.6 per cent) (Kantar WorldPanel, 2018). A
shared set of meat suppliers (2 Sisters, Moy Park, Cargill,
Faccenda) provide these retail outlets with much of their
‘own brand’ fresh and processed meat (Lang 2014).
Looking upstream from the perspective of the retail outlet
or food service provider, there is thus a complex network of
potential suppliers involved at various stages in the soy
value chain. Whilst a given retailer is likely to be connected
to a handful of major meat producers, the subsequent con-
nections to feed suppliers and traders is diffuse, meaning
that it is often difﬁcult, in some cases virtually impossible, to
trace back to the sources of production. This is even more
complex when supply chains are internationally distributed
across the various processing stages, as they typically are for
soy-linked products. In the UK, for example, the 2 Sisters
Food group sources some of its products from its Dutch
operations. Overall, whilst the UK sourced approximately
845,000 tonnes of soy from Brazil via direct imports in 2011
(Trase, 2018), the real volume of soy consumed (i.e. includ-
ing soy consumed indirectly in the form of animal feed) is
estimated to be closer to 1.9 m tonnes (out of the UK’s esti-
mated global 4.5 m tonne soy ‘footprint’) (SEI IOTA model;
Croft et al., 2018). Whilst the aforementioned multinational
traders reside at the core of the bulk of the supply chain
transactions associated with this volume of consumption, a
number of powerful actors mediate the stages in the value
chain, which co-exist in the soy ‘ecosystem’ (See Figure 1).
Collectively, these actors (along with ﬁnal consumers)
share a large degree of the overall responsibility for any
environmental damage associated with soy production. In
some cases, these supply chains are highly integrated (e.g.
Cargill); in others, different actors operate at each node.
From a GVC governance perspective, the key point is that,
with the exception of the retailers, none of these ﬁrms are
easily recognisable ‘brands’– a factor that has a signiﬁcant
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bearing of the ability of certiﬁed labels to convey product
information to consumers. Indeed, because the bulk of soy
is consumed indirectly, it is rarely listed as a product ingre-
dient. The case of soy thus raises two critical questions for
the GVC governance debate. The ﬁrst is that the presence
of large, dominant but ‘brandless’ ﬁrms in the GVC for soy
removes, or at least reduces, the market incentive to spon-
sor certiﬁcation. The second is that the embedded character
of soy and its omission from product information labels
means that these ﬁrms, at least until very recently, have
been shielded from consumer pressure and possibly
boycotts.
Private standards and certification in soy
Recalling Rueda et al.’s (2017) typology discussed earlier, pri-
vate certiﬁcation for soy requires some explanation, since it
fails a key condition for the emergence of such schemes:
namely, brand recognition by consumers and opportunities
for product differentiation of the basis of ‘quality’ attributes.
This explanation rests, in part, on the fact that the two
forces that have driven private certiﬁcation are not directly
about soy, but rather wider concerns surrounding the gover-
nance of GMOs and, more recently, deforestation. In the
case of GMOs, Garrett et al. (2013) argue that Brazil has
become an attractive marketplace for EU investment and
trade due to its continued production of GMO-free soy.
Here, private certiﬁcation schemes, including Cert-ID and
ProTerra, have emerged to assure downstream actors of the
absence of GMO material in their supply chains. ProTerra,
developed by Cert-ID and Genetic ID (Europe) between
2004 and 2005 (Meyer and Cederberg, 2013), is based on
the Basel Criteria for Sustainable Soy Production. It is cur-
rently used primarily for soy although it has been designed
to be applicable to all agricultural sectors (Lernoud et al.,
2017). ProTerra uses a quality management system
approach, collecting input from leading members of the
food and agricultural industry and public interest
Figure 1. A stylised representation of the soy GVC.
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organisations (Cert and Freire, 2011). In terms of require-
ments, in addition to the exclusion of GMO material, Pro-
Terra standards are designed to prevent the unsustainable
use of soil, pesticides and water, and to prevent landowners
from converting native forests or other high conservation
value areas into cropland (Garrett et al., 2013). The standard
requires that all ingredients in the supply chain are
inspected, audited, sampled and tested before granting a
non-GMO certiﬁcate, which means that the certiﬁed material
is fully segregated from non-GMO/non-certiﬁed material.
In the case of deforestation, the other major standard for
soy from Brazil centres on the provision of ‘responsible’ soy.
The RTRS certiﬁcation standards were developed via a ‘mul-
ti-stakeholder’ process spearheaded by WWF and modelled
on a similar set of standards for palm oil (RSPO) (Lernoud
et al., 2017; Mier y Teran, 2011). The RTRS comprises a gen-
eric set of principles and criteria that can be applied to
GMO, non-GMO and organic soy. RTRS certiﬁcation requires
ﬁrms to be assessed by an accredited third-party certiﬁca-
tion body and comply with environmental laws and man-
agement criteria regarding restoration, inputs and pollution.
Finally, farms are not allowed to convert native forests or
other high conservation value areas into cropland (Garrett
et al., 2013).
ProTerra and RTRS both aim to contribute to sustainable
and responsible soy production practices and thus share simi-
lar standards for assessing environmental performance, partic-
ularly on requirements for legal compliance, waste and
pollution management, labour conditions and gender equity,
child labour and community relations. ProTerra and RTRS are
also similar in relation to pesticide use (as they prohibit the
use of agrochemicals listed in the Stockholm and Rotterdam
Conventions) and in relation to greenhouse gas criteria with
both schemes targeting the reduction of emissions and
increase of carbon sequestration. There are, however, some
differences between Proterra and RTRS that directly or indi-
rectly impact their processes and outcomes. One fundamental
distinction lies in their governance. While Proterra follows the
Basel Criteria principles implemented by Cert-ID, a private
company, RTRS follows a ‘consensus building’ approach with
different stakeholder dialogue and engagement. Another sig-
niﬁcant difference between the two schemes refers to the
type of soy produced and how it is sourced. ProTerra does
not allow any GMO soy but RTRS accepts all kinds of soy,
including GMO. ProTerra certiﬁcation accepts a maximum
contamination limit of 0.1 per cent and RTRS a maximum of
0.9 per cent (Meyer and Cederberg, 2013).
In the case of RTRS, soybeans can be sourced in three
ways: through a segregated supply chain, using mass bal-
ance accounting (to keep track of how much of their pro-
duction is certiﬁed) or through a certiﬁcate-trading platform
(to enable buyers to purchase ‘credits’ from soybean grow-
ers with the assurance that overall consumption of RTRS soy
does not exceed production). The latter two mechanisms
thus do not ensure that soy reaching consumers has been
farmed responsibly. Regarding environmental responsibility,
the two schemes stipulate different cut-off periods for the
use of previously cleared land. ProTerra’s cut-off date is
1994 but they accept land that has been cleared up to
2004, if compensatory environmental measures have been
undertaken. RTRS has a cut-off date of May 2009, but they
have also developed a mapping project for Brazil, designed
to reduce the negative impact of soy expansion over more
important areas for biodiversity (Meyer and Cederberg,
2013).
Uptake of standards and alternative commitments
According to ProTerra, around 56.1 m tonnes of non-GMO
soy was produced globally in 2015, representing 17 per cent
of total soy output. Of this, just 5 m tonnes were segregated
along the value chain and certiﬁed by non-GMO standards,
with Brazil accounting for approximately 80 per cent of this
Table 1. Leading feed manufacturers in the EU28 – soy supply
chain (Source: Wattagnet, 2018)
Business Location
Tonnes
(’000s) Market share
ForFarmers N.V. Netherlands 9259 11.7%
Agriﬁrm Group Netherlands 6706 8.5%
De Heus Netherlands 5950 7.5%
Nutreco Netherlands 5900 7.5%
DLG Group Denmark 4500 5.7%
Agriﬁrm Feed Netherlands 4250 5.4%
Agravis Raiffeisen Germany 4060 5.1%
Avril/Sanders France 3400 4.3%
Veronesi Italy 3150 4.0%
DTC Deutsche
Tiernahrung
Cremer
Germany 2800 3.5%
Table 2. Leading poultry producers in the EU28 (Source:
Wattagnet, 2018)
Business Location
Head
slaughtered
annually Market share
LDC France 458.8 6.8%
Plukon Food Group Netherlands 395.2 5.9%
Gruppo Veronesi Italy 350 5.2%
PHW Group Germany 350 5.2%
AIA (Agricola
Italiana Alimentare)
Italy 350 5.2%
2 Sisters Food Group United
Kingdom
317 4.7%
Moy Park Ltd. United
Kingdom
260 3.9%
Amadori Italy 250 3.7%
Indykpol Capital
Group
Poland 250 3.7%
Rothk€otter
Mischfutterwerk
GmbH
Germany 190 2.8%
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output. Price premiums for certiﬁed non-GMO soy ﬂuctuate
from $16 to $54 per tonne (with ProTerra certiﬁcation add-
ing a further ~$4 per tonne, adding 5–10 per cent to the
price of soy which is typically $350–$600) (Garrett et al.,
2013). In comparison, in 2015, approximately 2.2 m tonnes
of production were certiﬁed under RTRS standards, with 1.4
m tonnes produced in Brazil. The price premium for RTRS
soy is signiﬁcantly lower than that for non-GMO, at around
$1.50 per tonne (Garrett et al., 2013). Globally, RTRS certiﬁed
soy accounts for less than 1 per cent of the market, which
is in contrast to RSPO certiﬁcation for palm oil, which
accounts for around 18 per cent of global markets (Garrett
et al., 2016). Whilst Brazil is clearly a key market for both
non-GMO and RTRS certiﬁed soy, these ﬁgures illustrate that,
overall the prevailing landscape of production in Brazil is
that dominated by GMO production and production that is
not certiﬁed as responsible.
A small market does exist for responsibly sourced soy, but
the fact that most soy is not certiﬁed under such standards
means that certiﬁcation is likely to be relatively ineffective in
promoting the transition towards sustainable production
that the standards are designed to induce. The implication
of this is that other forms of corporate governance may be
more appropriate. For example, in 2006 the ‘Soy Morato-
rium’ was established with the involvement of the Brazilian
Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE) and the
National Grain Exporters Association (ANEC) as a result of
pressure exerted initially from an inﬂuential report from
GreenPeace, entitled ‘Eating up the Amazon’, and then asso-
ciated pressure from NGOs and retailers (Gibbs et al., 2015;
Meijer, 2015). The moratorium comprises a voluntary agree-
ment by the soy industry to not purchase soy grown on
lands deforested post-2006 in the Brazilian Amazon. Since
the agreement, only a small amount of new deforestation
for soy has occurred in the Amazon, which is attributed to
the involvement of a limited number of actors able to exert
signiﬁcant control, the simplicity of requirements for compli-
ance, streamlined monitoring, and – importantly – simulta-
neous efforts by the Brazilian government to reduce
deforestation and active participation in the process by
NGOs and government agencies (Gibbs et al., 2015). Govern-
ment-level interventions such as Norway’s, which in 2008
committed to support a Brazilian government fund with $1-
billion of performance-based investment (dependent on a
lowering of deforestation rates) (Nepstad et al., 2014), have
helped to promote more stringent national policy develop-
ment and law enforcement (Boucher et al., 2013; Meijer,
2015). More recently, the New York Declaration on Forests
(NYDF) is representative of another high-proﬁle voluntary
agreement, which has the involvement of industry, NGO
and governmental bodies. Whilst not dedicated solely to soy
(rather it covers a basket of commodities linked to defor-
estation) it has acted as a catalyst for further political
engagement (e.g. the Amsterdam Declaration on eliminating
deforestation from European commodity supply chains) and
associated commitments to support transitions towards the
sole use of sustainable soy in supply chains by 2020. More
latterly, voluntary commitments such as the Cerrado
Manifesto have seen a multitude of retail and consumer
goods manufacturers commit to collaborative engagement
with local and international stakeholders, including govern-
ments, to halt the destruction of the Cerrado habitat.
Returning to the uptake of certiﬁed soy, a key barrier to
the mainstreaming of private, ‘market-based’ certiﬁcation
schemes appears to be a lack of downstream demand from
consumers. While groups that ‘represent’ consumers (i.e.
NGOs such as WWF and GreenPeace) have been proactive
in both the establishment of certiﬁcation schemes for soy
(or perhaps more accurately, establishing frameworks
designed to overcome the issue of deforestation to which
soy production is linked), and for other high-proﬁle activities
that have put pressure on supply chain actors (and resulted
in, for example, the Soy Moratorium), these do not, seem-
ingly, ﬁt the mould of consumer-driven initiatives such as
FairTrade cotton, coffee or cocoa, where a clear sustainabil-
ity price premium and associated ‘premium product’ percep-
tion is adopted by consumers themselves. The price
premium attached to certiﬁed products means that this
model is only ﬁnancially viable if there is recognition that
the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of sourcing certiﬁed soy outweigh the
costs; that actors believe the standards are sufﬁciently
robust; and that they feel their own actions will not be
undermined by unpunished ‘laggards’ in the system. Low
levels of uptake suggest that market-driven incentives are
not sufﬁciently strong to promote signiﬁcant uptake. The
structure of the supply chain, where soy is typically traded
‘in bulk’ has promoted dependence on mass balance and
credit-based systems of compliance as a ‘lower cost’ alterna-
tive to full segregation, but such models are signiﬁcantly
less robust in their delivery of truly sustainable products. For
GMO-free soy, where there is a clear regulatory and con-
sumer ‘push’ to guarantee compliance, price premiums asso-
ciated with certiﬁcation appear warranted, whereas the
same demand does not seem to be apparent for sustainabil-
ity concerns addressed by RTRS. Furthermore, there is clearly
a broad marketplace for uncertiﬁed soy, meaning incentives
for a transition to certiﬁed soy are undermined. The fact that
soy is a low-visibility commodity, with no requirement for
identiﬁcation on meat labels of the source or type of feed
used, does little to promote transparency in the system
that might otherwise promote more responsible sourcing
behaviours.
If the complex structure of the value chain and lack of
demand-side ‘push’, as we have argued, undermines the
proliferation of sustainability standards for soy, what then
does this mean for the certiﬁcation landscape? Multilateral
initiatives like the NYDF and Cerrado Manifesto appear to
have greater potential to drive the uptake of sustainable
soy, which may include that certiﬁed under RTRS or ProTerra
standards. However, it is likely that – even with these emer-
gent international pressures from governments, retailers and
NGOs – a similar set of challenges will still need to be over-
come for certiﬁcation to ﬂourish. The uptake of certiﬁed soy
will require conﬁdence in the rigour of such standards in
preventing biodiversity loss. This is currently unlikely given
that their anti-deforestation criteria are relatively ambiguous
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and cover native forests and areas of high conservation
value, which represent just a portion of potentially impor-
tant habitat, offering limited protection to environments like
the Cerrado (Meijer, 2015). Furthermore, the lack of required
segregation by RTRS, and the price premium imposed by
this segregated model within ProTerra standards, means
that downstream incentives must still be strong if a segre-
gated model of supply is to be developed. This will require
greater awareness and consumer ‘willingness to pay’ in both
European markets and, more importantly, in markets such
as China that represents a far larger and rapidly expanding
slice of Brazilian exports. Markets must work in conjunction
with NGO and national governance processes to ensure that
such incentives are promoted, retained and transferred to
other consumption contexts.
Conclusions
In this article, we have offered a contribution to the GVC
governance debate focusing on how the concept has been
appropriated by GVC scholars and applied to different cases.
We have argued that the dominant questions in most GVC
scholarship centre on the generation, control and distribu-
tion of economic value. Whilst not dismissing the central
importance of these questions, we have cast the net a little
wider to consider the transnational politics of what, for want
of a better term, can be called the ‘sustainability’ agenda. To
do this, we have focused on the case of soy – a commodity
that is produced intensively and traded extensively with
acute environmental consequences – and asked two related
questions: does soy conform to GVC assumptions about
governance? And what form has this taken with respect to
environmental sustainability? In answering the ﬁrst question,
we have found soy to be a rather poor ﬁt with existing
models. Although recent interventions in the debate (e.g.
Lee et al., 2012) have sought to nuance the GVC vocabulary
to account for the different forms of economic organization
found in agrifood, this only takes us so far. We showed that
the case of soy represents a poor ﬁt with existing GVC cate-
gories not simply because of the presence of what Lee et al.
(2012) refer to as ‘bilateral oligopolies’ (i.e. powerful ﬁrms
both ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’). It is also due to the exis-
tence of discrete producer-trader relationships within each
node in which functionally similar ﬁrms perform a variety of
different roles according the speciﬁc nature of their business
relationships. Further, the particular way that soy is embed-
ded in the food system adds a further layer of complexity
to the value chain analysis. While this shields consumer-
facing ﬁrms, that is, retailers, from the externalities of soy
production and trade, it also limits their power to control or
mitigate these effects, if they were inclined to do so. Indeed,
there is a striking parallel between the analytical challenges
that soy poses for researchers seeking to understand the
drivers of soy production (and hence deforestation and
habitat loss) and the practical difﬁculties that retailers have
in accessing the data necessary to inform their own commit-
ments to ethical sourcing. These factors combined help us
to answer our second question, where we found that private
certiﬁcation – in the form of ProTerra and RTRS – has played
a relatively minor (and largely ineffective) role in the gover-
nance of soy in comparison to, for example, the Soy Morato-
rium or recent multilateral schemes like the NYDF and the
Cerrado Manifesto. This is clearly a provisional judgement as
it is obvious that a more thorough comparative assessment
is needed – both of soy in general and of its governance
more speciﬁcally. In the meantime, we hope our analysis
has succeeded in making a not insigniﬁcant contribution to
the ongoing GVC governance debate – and, perhaps, the
ﬁrst step towards a wider, more inclusive and fully interdisci-
plinary research agenda.
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